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UTILITIES, THE STATE, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
By PAUL M. HOGAN*
Introduction
Regulation of public utilities by governmental agencies has long pre-
sented the courts with many vexing problems of law. Regardless of the
specific issues litigated, the fundamental question to be resolved is whether
the state, in furtherance of the general welfare, shall undertake to control
industries owned and operated by private citizens thereby depriving them
of a measure of freedom in their business dealings.
In this field the theory underlying state control of private business is
that certain public service enterprises must be protected from competition
so that the public may be assured of efficient service at a reasonable cost.'
Telephone companies because of the complexity of their operations, and
gas, electric and water companies because of the undesirability of wasteful
and expensive duplication of service are natural monopolies.' Companies
which provide services of this type are clearly of value and use to the com-
munity. They ought not to be limited in their operations by destructive
competition. Because of their nature it is impossible for these services to be
performed efficiently by numerous small competing concerns. Since cor-
porations of this kind are usually the only ones operating in their field in
a community, it is imperative that the consumer be protected against arbi-
trarily enhanced rates and discrimination on the part of the utilities.3
Development of Regulation in California
This problem has been met by state control. In 1911, California by
amending its constitution4 created the Railroad Commission and conferred
upon the legislature extraordinary plenary power in all matters pertaining
to regulation of public utilities.
This amendment empowered the legislature to regulate and supervise
public utilities and to confer upon the Railroad Commission powers addi-
tional to those conferred upon the Commission by the constitution. The
amendment designated several industries, including telephone corporations,
as public utilities and subjected such industries to the regulation and con-
trol of the Railroad Commission.' Finally, it provided that no other pro-
* Member, Second-Year Class.
1 Richardson v. Railroad Comm'n, 191 Cal. 717, 218 Pac. 418 (1923) ; In re Martinez,
56 Cal. App. 2d 473, 132 P.2d 901 (1942).
2 Eshleman, Control of Public Utilities in CaliJornia, 2 CA=F. L. Rv. 104, 108-9, (1914).
3 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
4 CAL. CoNsT. art. XII, §§ 22, 23 (§ 22 as amended November 5, 1946, renamed the Rail-
road Commission the Public Utilities Commission).
5 CAL. CoNST. art. XII § 23.
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vision of the constitution might be construed to be a limitation upon the
power and functions of the legislature in this respect.' So sweeping and all-
inclusive were the powers thus granted that the California Supreme Court
was impelled to liken the power of the legislature over public utilities to
that of the English Parliament, whose voice, unhampered by the restric-
tions of a written constitution, was the law of the land.7
Commission Powers and Limitations
Subsequent enactments of the legislature, utilizing the constitutional
powers vested in it together with liberal judicial construction of these wide
grants, have tended to bear out the correctness of this view. In California,
the Commission's authority to regulate extends to every corporation desig-
nated by the constitution or the legislature as a public utility.8 The Com-
mission, not purely a judicial body, may act upon its own motion to inves-
tigate the operations of any person or corporation functioning as a public
utility.9 Once the Commission has acted, it has exclusive jurisdiction over
subject matter properly before it,10 and the superior court has no power to
interfere with its orders or decisions." It may set aside any prior order or
determination of the courts in a matter coming under its exclusive juris-
diction. 2
Orders and decisions of the Commission are reviewable only in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.13 The jurisdiction of that court is limited to a deter-
mination of the regularity of the Commission's proceedings and the validity
of any claims made by a petitioner as to an alleged violation of his rights
under the federal Constitution.'4 The Commission's findings of fact and of
ultimate facts in issue are conclusive and not subject to review. Therefore
decisions of the Commission may be attacked only by way of challenging
its jurisdiction. 5
A casual reading of the applicable constitutional and code provisions
would suggest that the legislature and the Commission are omnipotent in
the area of public utility regulation. Undoubtedly the powers granted them
are very broad but neither body may, by its declaration alone, determine
what is and what is not a public utility.6 Although the constitution has
expressly designated certain kinds of businesses as public utilities, this is
6 CAL. CoNsr. art. XII § 22.
7 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 658, 137 Pac. 1119, 1127 (1913).
8 CAL. PuB. UTM. CODE § 701.
9 Miller v. Railroad Comm'n, 9 Cal. 2d 190, 197, 70 P.2d 164, 168 (1937).
10 1d. at 197, 70 P.2d at 168.
11 City of Oakland v. Key Sys., 64 Cal. App. 2d 427, 434, 149 P.2d 195, 199 (1944).
12Miller v. Railroad Comm'n, 9 Cal. 2d 190, 195, 70 P.2d 164, 168 (1937).
13 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1759.
34 CAL. PUB. UT. CODE § 1757.
15 CAL. PuB. Urn. CODE § 1757; People v. Western Air Lines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723
(1954).
16 Allen v. Railroad Comm'n, 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac. 466 (1918), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 601
(1919) ; Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 176 Cal. 518, 169 Pac. 62 (1917).
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not to say that all enterprises within the prescribed classes are such." Nor
is it within the power of the state to declare businesses which are essen-
tially private enterprises to be public utilities merely by legislative fiat.'
8
The legislature and the Commission are bound to act within the limits
of the federal Constitution.' 9 It has been held that the jurisdiction of the
Commission, constituting as it does an exercise of the police power of the
state, must be exercised reasonably." Peter E. Mitchell, president of the
California Public Utilities Commission, wrote recently:21
Thus reasonableness becomes the most important single standard in utility
regulation. It is in this zone that the Commission must exercise its discre-
tion after the facts have been presented for its consideration ... In that
manner only can the public interest be served.
Failure to act reasonably in imposing public regulation upon private
industry would constitute an impairment of obligation of contract and a
taking of private property for public use without compensation in violation
of the federal Constitution.'
Jurisdictional Criteria: What is a Public Utility?
What, then, is a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction? It is well settled
that the regulatory powers of the Commission are cognate and germane
only to the regulation of public utilities.2 3 Conversely it would seem that
regulation of an enterprise not properly a public utility would be an abuse
of jurisdiction and hence an unconstitutional exercise of the police power.24
It is necessary therefore to determine what is a public utility. The Cali-
fornia Constitution, as implemented by the Public Utility Code, does not
define the term "public utility" but merely designates specific industries as
such. Therefore one must turn to the common law to understand the nature
and characteristics of a public utility business.
Common Law Concept
The basic approach of the courts in determining this question is clearly
summarized in a quotation from Lord Hale's treatise De Portibus Maris
cited in the landmark case of Munn v. Illinois :
25
17 Story v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057 (1921).
18 Sequoia Nat'l Park Stages Co. v. Sequoia & Gen. Grant Nat'l Park Co., 210 Cal. 156,
291 Pac. 208 (1930); Allen v. Railroad Comm'n, 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac. 466 (1918).
19 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 1119 (1913).
20 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) ; Del Mar Water Co. v. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666,
680, 140 Pac. 591, 597 (1914).
21 Mitchell, The History and Scope of Public Utilities Regulation in California, 30 So.
CALiF. L. RFv. 118, 130 (1957).
22 Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
23 Morel v. Railroad Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 488, 81 P.2d 144 (1938); City of Pasadena v.
Railroad Comm'n, 183 Cal. 526, 192 Pac. 25 (1920); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman,
166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 1119 (1913).2 4 Ibid.
-5 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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... A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up
a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree
... for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz., make the
most of his own... If the King or subject have a public wharf, unto which
all persons who come to that port must come... because they are the
wharf's only licensed by the Queen... or because there are no other wharfs
only licensed by the Queen ... or because there is no other wharf in the
port... in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary or excessive duties ...
neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the duties must be
reasonable and moderate... For now the wharf and crane and other con-
veniences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris
privati only ....
The problem is: At what point may the state regulate in order to secure
reasonably efficient service at fair rates? While it is desirable that services
offered by these monopolies be rendered to the public, the public must be
protected against the tendency of monopolies to establish arbitrary and
capricious rates for their services and to discriminate between customers.2 6
The Dedication Cases
In making this determination the California courts have indicated a
preoccupation with the element of dedication to public use." It would ap-
pear that the element of a genuine public need of protection against monop-
olistic abuse has often been assumed without discussion in the opinions.
Possibly this is because of the obvious public service character of the
enterprises.
Because of the emphasis laid by the courts upon the attribute of a dedi-
cation of property to the public at large this doctrine of dedication has been
gradually broadened. The first step in this direction was the imposition of
public regulation over enterprises which offered their commodities or serv-
ices to the public generally, rather than to a particular, limited class of
contract customers. 28 Thus, one must have dedicated his property or serv-
ices to all comers, indiscriminately and without limitation. The theory
underlying this test is that dedication of the business vests in each member
of the public who desires the use of such commodities or services a right
that they shall be continued under reasonable rates.2"
The doctrine of dedication to public use was next expanded by the hold-
ing that a service rendered to the public generally need not mean that it
must be used by all who desire to use it, but only be available for use.80 It
26 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1922) ; see
Eshleman, Control of Public Utilities in California, 2 Ca=. L. Rav. 104, 108-9 (1914) (Mr.
Eshleman was the first president of the California Railroad Commission).
27 See Del Mar Water Co. v. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 680, 140 Pac. 591, 597 (1914) ; Thayer
v. California Dev. Bd., 164 Cal. 117, 127, 128 Pac. 21, 25 (1912).
28 Story v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057 (1921) ; Pinney v. Los Angeles Gas
Corp., 168 Cal. 12, 141 Pac. 620 (1915).
2 9 Richardson v. Railroad Comm'n, 191 Cal. 716, 218 Pac. 418 (1923).
30 Thayer v. California Dev. Bd., 164 Cal. 117, 127, 128 Pac. 21, 25 (1912).
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is no giant step from this proposition to the realization that it is sufficient
that the commodity or service be offered only to a definable portion of the
public on an equal, non-discriminatory and unrestricted basis.31
Having gone that far, the courts sought to limit the doctrine of dedica-
tion. It was apparent that the butcher, the baker, and others in the common
callings could not reasonably be subjected to public control as a public
utility.32 Therefore additional tests were needed before an enterprise might
be designated as a public utility to prevent the requirement of reasonable-
ness in the exercise of the police power from being severely stretched.
"Public Interest" Test
The United States Supreme Court decided in the case of Charles Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations33 that the test should be based
upon the nature of the business, its relation to the public, and the abuses
reasonably to be feared if the business remains unregulated.
The Court's use of the phrase "public interest" harks back to Lord
Hale's description of natural monopolies as being those businesses "affected
with a public interest." Further, the test of possible abuse to which the
public may be submitted is reminiscent of Hale's example of natural mo-
nopolies.34 In a general discussion of the problem the Court noted that two
classes of businesses are utilities per se. These are enterprises given a
franchise or other special power from the state and those which have been
historically denominated as public utilities, such as grist mills, cabs and
common carriers. All other businesses, the Court held, must meet certain
criteria before being declared subject to state regulation as public utilities.
The commodity sold or service rendered must be unequivocally dedicated
to public use without distinction or discrimination. Further, the business
must be "affected with a public interest"-that is, it must be in the public
interest to regulate it so as to prevent the infliction of wrongs upon the
public. 5
Voluntary Submission to Control as a Public Utility
As has been noted, the California Supreme Court has placed increasing
emphasis upon devotion to public use as a criterion of the Commission's
jurisdiction over public service enterprises. How is the Commission's juris-
diction affected by voluntary submission to its control? This question has
been presented to the court several times in the past. The answer may be
obtained from a comparison of the facts underlying the decisions in a
sampling of the cases.
31 Pinney v. Los Angeles Gas Corp., 168 Cal. 12, 141 Pac. 620 (1915).
32 See note 18 supra.
33 262 U.S. 522 (1922).
34 94 U.S. at 127.
35 262 U.S. at 539-40.
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In Van Hoosear v. Railroad Commission, 6 a farmer undertook to sup-
ply water from his small well to four or five neighbors. He made oral agree-
ments with each of them but never obtained a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the Commission. Later, he voluntarily applied to the
Commission for permission to discontinue his water-supply service. In
reviewing a decision by the Commission adverse to the farmer, the court
upheld the Commission's assertion and continuance of jurisdiction over
this service on the ground that it had no power to review the facts as found
by the Commission. Since the farmer had voluntarily surrendered to the
Commission jurisdiction, there was no constitutional question raised and
the court could not inquire further.17 However, the court noted that its
decision was made reluctantly as the farmer's plant hardly seemed to con-
stitute a business to which the obligations and responsibilities of a public
utility would seem appropriate. 38
Multipartite Agreements
The court went even farther in Franscioni v. Soledad when it an-
nounced: 39
We see no substantial reason why a corporation owning a water supply and
engaged in distributing it ... upon a use which is private, not public or
general, may not, with the consent of the owners, change the use from pri-
vate to public so as to make the rates subject to public regulation.
In the Franscioni case the Soledad Land and Water Company had
acquired a water irrigation business which it operated in accordance with
private contract arrangements with its consumers. Pursuant to the pro-
visions of a special statute relating only to water companies,40 the corpora-
tion joined with twenty-five taxpayers and inhabitants of the county in
petitioning the County Board of Supervisors to set its rates. The Board
did so. Later the company found this enterprise unprofitable and sought
to have its status as a public utility terminated. It was held that it could
not do so without the consent of the users.
In Palermo Land and Water Co. v. Railroad Comm'n4' the water com-
pany had provided in contracts with its consumers that the rates for service
should be those established by law. Later the company voluntarily re-
quested the Commission to establish its rates. It was held that submission
to the control of the Commission, coupled with the understanding between
the parties that the rates should be those established by law, clearly served
as a dedication of its services to a public use.
36 184 Cal. 553, 194 Pac. 1003 (1920).
37 Id. at 555, 194 Pac. at 1005.
38 Ibid.
39 Franscioni v. Soledad Land & Water Co., 170 Cal. 221, 224, 149 Pac. 161, 163 (1915).
40 Cal. Stat. Ch. CXV, §§ 1, 2, at p. 95 (1885).
4- 173 Cal. 380, 160 Pac. 288 (1916).
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Ex Parte Action
In Allen v. Railroad Comm'n42 the petitioner had contracted to furnish
water for irrigation purposes to various lots of land that it had sold. It had
also embarked upon the business of furnishing water to a small village in
which respect it was clearly a public utility subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction. However, finding its contracts with the landowners unprofit-
able, it sought to have the Commission establish its rates with respect to
its contract customers. The California Supreme Court held that the water
company could not establish itself as a public utility merely by fixing the
rates and charges for its services, declaring itself to be a public utility, and
voluntarily offering to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
With the exception of the Van Hoosear case, in which the court enter-
tained much doubt, a comparison of the above cases would indicate that
something more than a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
Commission as found in the Allen case is necessary before an enterprise
may be declared a public utility. In Palermo, it was an agreement to abide
by the rates fixed by law; in Franscioni, consent by the subscribers.
The Commercial Communications Decision
The question of the effect of voluntary filing upon Commission juris-
diction was recently brought before the California court in the case of
Commercial Communications v. PUC.43 In 1948, the Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Company, a public utility telephone corporation, began
leasing radio equipment on a lease-maintenance contract basis to private
individuals and corporations. The radio equipment was to be used for
two-way radiotelephone communication within each of the businesses for
wholly private purposes. Before contracting with Pacific, each user was
required to obtain an operator's license from the Federal Communications
Commission. By the terms of the license, no licensee could tie in with
Pacific's public mobile radiotelephone system, nor could any licensee com-
municate with any of the other nets so leased by Pacific. In April, 1956,
Pacific voluntarily filed a tariff of rates with the California Public Utilities
Commission (successor to the Railroad Commission) covering the services
to the licensees which had hitherto been conducted on an individual con-
tract basis. This move was resisted by several of the smaller competing
organizations engaged in the business of leasing radio communication sys-
tems to private parties. These organizations challenged the Commission's
power to accept such a tariff. Consequently an investigation and hearing
was conducted by the Commission upon its own motion. Ultimately, the
Commission found that the nature of the service offered by Pacific was
that of a public utility. Pacific's voluntary filing of the tariff, the Commis-
sion held, was in effect a continuing offer by it to lease its equipment to all
42 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac. 466 (1918).
43 50 Cal. 2d ......... 327 P.2d 513 (1958).
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qualified customers, and so was a dedication of its services to a public use
within the meaning of the constitutional and code provisions."'
Radio Communication: A Telephone Business
Upon the Commission's denial of a petition for rehearing, an applica-
tion for a writ of review by the California Supreme Court was granted. The
court upheld the Commission's jurisdiction in a four to three decision.
In reaching this result, the majority relied principally upon the construc-
tion of Article XII, Section 23 of the California Constitution and applica-
ble sections of the Public Utilities Code.
The constitutional provisions were made applicable to Pacific as lessor
of communications equipment by giving effect to the use of the disjunctive
"or" therein:45
... Every private corporation ... owning, operating, managing or con-
trolling any plant ... for the transmission of telephone.., messages...
is hereby declared to be a public utility.... (Emphasis added.)
Pacific's ownership of radio telephone systems leased to private parties
was held to be within the jurisdiction of the Commission by a liberal inter-
pretation of sections 216,48 23311 and 23448 of the Public Utilities Code.
The word "telephone," as used in these code sections, was held to be capa-
ble of a general definition as:49 "An instrument for producing sounds,
especially articulate speech." It was held that this definition was applicable
to a radiotelephone system as well as one making use of land wires. In this
connection the court emphasized the wording of section 233 of the code
which provides, in defining a telephone line, that the communication af-
forded thereby need not be with the use of tranmission wires."° However,
the court recognized that in order to constitute communication by tele-
phone within the meaning of the code, the communication must necessarily
be two way. 1
44 55 Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 387 (1956).
4 5 CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 23.
40 CAL. PUB. UTI. CODE § 216:
"(a) Public utility includes every... telephone corporation ... where the service
is performed for or the commodity delivered to the public or any portion thereof.
"(b) Whenever any... telephone corporation ... performs a service or delivers a
commodity to the public or any portion thereof for which any compensation or
payment whatsoever is received, such . . . telephone corporation . . . is a public
utility subject to the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the commission and the
provisions of this part."
4 7 CAL. PuB. UT. CODE § 233:
"Telephone line . .. includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments,
and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures and personal property owned, con-
trolled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by
telephone, whether such communication is had with or without the use of trans-
mission wires."
48 CAL. PuB. UT. CODE § 234, defining a telephone corporation as every party owning,
controlling, operating or managing any telephone line for compensation.
4 9 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (2d ed., 1949).
5 50 Cal. 2d at_ ...... 327 P.2d at 516 (1958).
51 Television Transmission Inc. v. PUC, 47 Cal. 2d 89, 301 P.2d 862 (1956).
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No fault can be found with this construction of the code. Among other
things, the court took judicial notice of commonly used words in accord-
ance with their dictionary meaning.52 Although words used in the code
sections are to be interpreted in accordance with their meaning at the time
of enactment, 53 the meaning of generic terms can be extended to include
objects later invented but within the class defined by the word.5"
Applicability of the Public Interest Test
Is it enough, then, to say that because a dedication to a public use is
found and because the terms of the California Constitution and the code
may be logically extended to cover the business, that it is per se a public
utility? In answering this question it would be well to remember the cri-
teria announced in the Wolff caseY What is the nature of the business, the
feature which touches the public, and what are the abuses reasonably to be
feared?
The California court, in considering these problems, noted that without
control by the government, radio-telephony might well "clutter" frequency
channels.56 Factually, there is little basis for this conjecture because the
licensing provisions of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 empower
the Federal Communications Commission to prevent this dilemma by dis-
tributing radio frequencies to licensees.57
The federal government has abstained from rate regulation in this
field,5" so the states may, in a proper case, regulate rates charged for the
transmission of radio communications. But what abuses are likely to be
encouraged if the rates and charges for the leasing of inert radio equip-
ment to industries for wholly private purposes are unregulated?
The court implied that the "telephone business" does tend to become a
monopoly.59 This is true of public utility telephone service conducted over
land lines and requiring the use of numerous switchboards, interchanges
and relay stations. Is it true, however, of wholly private communications
systems, not requiring connections to public telephone systems? It has
been held that telephone systems utilizing land lines, but operated for the
sole convenience of the members of mutual associations of farmers, are
not public utilities.' If this is so, why does not the same principle hold true
for radio communications systems used entirely for private business pur-
poses? It is difficult to see how a business, in which there are at present
52 23 CAL. JUR. Statutes § 123, at 748 (1925).
53 Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761 (1899).
54 Sterling Drug Co. v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 393, 221 P.2d 965 (1950) ; Gaiser v. Buck,
203 Ind. 9, 179 N.E. 1 (1931); Commonwealth v. Tilley, 306 Mass. 412, 28 N.E.2d 245 (1940).
55 See note 33 supra and text following.
56 50 Cal. 2d at ......... 327 P.2d at 518.
5748 Stat. 1083, 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1934).5 8 Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
59 50 Cal. 2d at ........ , 327 P.2d at 518; California Fireproof Storage Co. v. Brundage,
198 Cal. 185, 248 Pac. 669 (1926).
60 See People ex rel. Knowlton v. Orange Co. Farmers' and Merchants' Ass'n, 56 Cal. App.
205, 204 Pac. 873 (1922).
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several healthy competitors, can be considered such a potential monopoly
as to require public regulation. Competition is possible in this field because
the nature of private radio communications systems does not require coor-
dinated action among the several competitors to achieve efficient operation,
as would be the case if there were many competing public utility telephone
companies.
Incidental Public Interest
It was noted by the court that many of the customers requiring radio
communication facilities were governmental agencies, such as fire and
police departments, and other public utility corporations, such as trucking
firms and water and irrigation companies." The Minnesota Supreme Court
held on this point that telephone facilities offered by the telephone com-
pany to city police and fire departments, not being a part of the public
telephone system, were not subject to public regulation."2 The United States
Supreme Court (in exercise of its jurisdiction as court of last resort for the
District of Columbia) ruled that the leasing of telephone equipment to be
used for inter-office communication in private and government buildings
was not a public utility service.3 And where a private telephone company
had a franchise from the city to maintain its telephone lines and wires in
the city streets, it was not held to be a public utility for this reason." As
was stated by Justice Schauer in the dissenting opinion in the Commercial
Communications case:"-
It was never contemplated that the definition of public service corporations
as defined by our constitution be so elastic as to fan out and include busi-
nesses in which the public might be incidentally interested ....
The effect of Pacific's filing is readily distinguishable from the three
voluntary submission cases in which the court upheld the Commission's
jurisdiction. In none of those cases were business competitors involved.
The customers there were completely dependent upon the irrigation com-
panies for their water supply. Because this element of a monopolistic
threat to the public has been assumed without discussion in the opinions,
these cases are misleading as to the effect of voluntary filing.
Moreover, in the voluntary submission cases, each petitioner was
trying to evade the control of the Commission. On the other hand, in the
Commercial Communications case, Pacific was seeking Commission juris-
diction. In this respect, it is more like the Allen case where it was held
that the Commission had no jurisdiction when the water company had
done no more than to file its rates with the Commission.' In any event,
61 50 Cal. 2d at ........ 327 P.2d at 520.
62 City of St. Paul v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 193 Minn. 484, 258 N.W. 822 (1935).
63 Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U.S. 238 (1902).
6 People ex rel. Knowlton v. Orange Co. Farmers' & Merchants' Ass'n, 56 Cal. App. 205,
204 Pac. 873 (1922); State PUC v. Bethany Mut. Tel. Ass'n, 270 11. 183, 110 N.E. 334 (1915).
65 50 Cal. 2d at __., 327 P.2d at 526.
66 See note 42 supra and text following.
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in the voluntary submission cases considered above, more was found in
the facts as a basis for jurisdiction than mere voluntary submission to
commission regulation. In the opinion of. this writer, something more must
be found.
Lack of Constitutional Rights
It is important to note that certain provisions of the California Public
Utilities Code placed the petitioners at a procedural disadvantage. Even
though before the court, in their capacity as competitors of the telephone
company the petitioners were not in a position to assert a lack of due
process of law by reason of the Commission's proceedings nor a depriva-
tion of property without due process, nor a denial of the equal protection
of the laws.67 The Commission was asserting its jurisdiction over the tele-
phone company, not over its competitors. No one, it has been held, has
a legally enforceable right at common law to conduct his business free
from the fair competition of others.' Since the petitioners were unable
to raise constitutional questions before the California Supreme Court, it
must be as to them the court of last resort.
Their sole argument properly before the court went to the jurisdiction
of the Commission. The Commission is empowered by law to entertain
complaints from any and all parties who may have any pecuniary interest
in its proceedings.69 This authority would seem to include business com-
petitors. Once a party is before the Commission, he has standing before
the California Supreme Court in any hearing upon review of the Com-
mission's proceedings."0 But in order to challenge the Commission's au-
thority as being a violation of the due process clause, a petitioner must
show the Commission has taken action directly against him. And this, of
course, a mere business competitor is powerless to do.
It is highly conjectural what the court would have done had the pe-
titioners been protesting the assertion of Commission jurisdiction over
their own businesses. It is felt that, in view of the criteria established in
the Wolff case, a decision affirming the jurisdiction of the Commission,
if reviewable by the United States Supreme Court, could not stand.
Effect of the Commercial Communications Decision
The practical effect of the Commercial Communications decision is
profound. A revealing insight into the operations of the Commission is
furnished in the case of Samuelson v. PUC.7 1 The point in issue was
whether the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring a firm,
serving thirty-two customers on a private contract basis, to be a common
carrier. The Commission stated emphatically that its distinction between
67 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 277 (1932).
68 See Sale v. Railroad Comm'n, 15 Cal. 2d 612, 104 P.2d 38 (1940).
69 CAL. PUB. UTI. CODE § 1757.
70 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1702.
7136 Cal. 2d 722, 227 P.2d 256 (1951).
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private and public carriers was founded upon the number of persons served
by the proposed utility. Thus, if a business within the constitutional desig-
nation of "utilities" did not restrict and limit its business operations to
relatively few customers, it might more easily be designated a utility by
the Commission. How many customers might exceed "relatively few" the
Commission did not say.
In the Samuelson case the court expressly overruled the Commission's
test of "substantial restrictiveness" as a basis for finding a dedication or
holding out of service to the public. However this may be, it would seem
that if a potential utility were carrying on extensive operations and serving
a large number of customers, this might well be a decisive and influential
makeweight upon the thinking of the Commission. It is worthwhile at
this point to reiterate the finality and conclusiveness of the Commission's
findings of fact,72 and to note that finding of a dedication to public use
may be a finding of fact.73
Conclusion
What, then, is the net effect of this decision? Pacific, protected by the
state against destructive competition, has become a giant in the field of
telephone communication. Because of its size and the wide scope of its
facilities, it is now in a position to preempt the field of lease-maintenance
of radio equipment to individual users for private purposes. Pacific's
competitors, on the other hand, would do well to restrict their operations
in order to avoid the liability of impliedly dedicating their property and
services to the public use and so becoming public utility telephone
companies.
Because Pacific is operating under regulated rates, the private com-
petitors are to some degree forced to match their rates with Pacific's.
Because of Pacific's size, this could preclude profitable operation by
them. While true the Commission would probably prevent this, it is also
true that the private entrepreneurs in this field will be substantially in-
fluenced in their dealings and in the development of their businesses by
the future decisions of the Commission.
It may well be that the Commercial Communications case has created
conditions conducive to the growth of an undesirable monopoly in this
field. If this is the practical result, the state is in the anomolous position
of creating the very thing which public utility regulation was originally
established to control.74
72 CAL. PuB. UTIn. CODE § 1757; People v. Western Air Lines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723
(1954).
73 Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 39 Cal. App. 535, 103 P.2d 1043 (1940).
74 See Sale v. Railroad Comm'n, 15 Cal. 2d 612, 104 P.2d 38 (1940) (Comm'n was created
to protect the people of the state from the consequences of destructive competition and monop-
oly in the public service industries). Accord: California Motor Transp. v. Railroad Comm'n,
30 Cal. 2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 (1944).
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